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Michael Hillard: This is April 7, 2003. This is an interview with Carl 
Turner, international representative with PACE former UPIU local President 
at Hinckley Somerset S.D. Warren mill. 
Alright, so let me just start by telling you that when we talked on the phone I 
told you that 1 part of my study -- 
[[phone ringing]] 
First place that -- 
[[cough]] 
Make it that stipulation, like anybody gets displaced like that.  
Carl Turner: Yup, yup. 
MH: You see it all the time up there. 
CT: Okay. 
(00:00:32) 
MH: Those people aren’t any different than somebody who is, whose job 
[[inaudible]] 
CT: We were very successful up in Berlin there. We got a $4.5 million TAA. 
So that worked out good up there. But, now, we got the mill started back up. 
So -- 
MH: Oh good, oh good. 
(00:00:54) 
CT: Benefit in both directions. 







MH: So, what I was starting to say was that 1 part of what I’m interested in 
is kind of how the whole jointness and enabling phase played out, as I’ve 
come to know more about it, not just at Westbrook, but at the other mills I 
mean as well. 
(00:01:25) 
But what I’d like to do, if you don’t mind today, is maybe start with your 
background and getting into the union leadership at the Hinckley mill and 
also what the labor relations there were about.  
So, why don’t we start with this question then. How’d you 1st get your job at 
the Hinckley mill?  
(00:01:49) 
CT: Prior to working at Hinckley, I worked at Old Town, Maine. It was 
Diamond International at the time.  
I worked there for 5 years and then they built the mill in Skowhegan. In 1976 
it opened and I applied there and got hired in October 1976. 
(00:02:08) 
MH: So you were right in there from the start. 
CT: Yes I was. 
MH: What was it like to start up a brand new mill? 
CT: It was time consuming, a lot of overtime, lot of problems that they didn’t 
predict, you know, changing different lines and systems, and new operators, 
and so it was quite an experience.  





CT: They were all over the lot. A lot of them transferred up from Winslow, 
Maine from the mill down there when they opened the Skowhegan one. So, 
those people were experienced also. 
MH: Now is that the Scott Winslow tissue mill? 
CT: Yes, it was. 
(00:02:42) 
MH: Oh, okay. Some of the management came over from there as well? 
CT: Yes they did. I had more experience in a pulp and paper mill probably 
because I worked in Old Town and we had a similar, same, digester systems 
and pulp mill that they had in Skowhegan.  
MH: How did you come to get involved in the union? 
(00:03:01) 
CT: Back in 1971 I was elected Treasurer up in Old Town. I was the 
Treasurer of the union from ’71 to ’76. Sitting on 3 negotiations up there 
during that period of time.  
When I transferred to Skowhegan, I ran for union office. I got elected as a 
recording secretary. I was a recording secretary for 2 years and then I become 
Vice-President for 2 years and then I was President for 10 years. 
(00:03:26) 
MH: Oh, okay. So what year did you get elected President? 
CT: 1987. 
MH: 1987, oh okay, interesting time.  
[[background voices]] 
While we’re on it, just because I’m curious, do you know anything about the 
labor history of the Old Town mill and like when it unionized? 




MH: Did you get the sense that people there did know or that it had gone 
back a far ways? 
CT: Yes, it has, been unionized quite a few years.  
MH: Okay, okay. 
CT: Also, during that period of time from ’87 to ’97, I was on the executive 
board of the AFL-CIO and was also part of the Maine Labor Council which 
represented all the pulp and paper mills in the state of Maine for 10 years. 
(00:04:10) 
MH: Okay. I was gonna ask you about that. So, I’ll come back and we’ll dig 
in more about all those different roles that you had there. 
But, let’s talk about the labor relations at Hinckley. 
Generally speaking, how would you describe them: cooperative, combative, a 
mix of both? 
(00:04:31) 
CT: Scott Paper was more cooperative because of the agreement that 
international had with Scott Paper Company about jointness and working 
together. 
S.D. Warren, when they changed over to the S.D. Warren Company, it was 
similar to the same because it was still Scott Paper Company.  
We had our ups and downs and problems but it was, we always worked them 
out. We had a few grievances and arbitrations but we resolved them.  
(00:04:59) 
MH: So you found in the days before jointness, you were able to at least 
come to resolution about things you did disagree about. 
CT: Come to resolutions through more arbitration cases, yes. 




CT: Lot of it would be, where it was a new mill,  
[[background voices]] 
and there was no past practice, so there was disagreements on both sides 
during the startup period. 
And it took a few years in order to go through negotiations, getting some 
practices established, interpretations of the contract with arbitrators.  
Then after a while it become history where we could look back and see how a 
situation was handled. 
(00:05:41) 
MH: And those things would be things like how is overtime allocated, due 
process for losing a job? 
CT: Yes. It’s all spelled out in the contract.  
And but at the beginning, you know there was disagreement of whether 
employee, for example, whether they were, had to work overtime to make up 
for the lost time that they weren’t given the opportunity, or whether they 
were made whole for it and were being paid for it if they missed. 
(00:06:05) 
A lot of ‘em was violations of, for example, management doing bargaining 
unit work, the wrong craft being assigned to a different job, things like that. 
MH: I see, okay. So, pretty standard stuff. 
(00:06:21) 
Now during that period, what kind of, now I’m thinking about the period 
leading up to say 1987 when you became President.  
What kinds of relationships did your locals have 1st of all with the other 




CT: We had kind of a unique relationship. We worked good together. We 
didn’t have a lot of disagreements.  
We sat down, talked about the issues and when we would enter negotiations 
we went in as a group: the IBW, the IEM, and the UPIU at that time. Went in 
and bargained the contract together for similar issues that we had. 
(00:07:03) 
Then once we worked on the general agenda, and then each group would 
break off and do the local items. But we never never fought with one another. 
We always got it resolved. 
MH: I see. 
CT: Different than some of the other mills where there was a bunch of 
different unions in there. Some mills, they don’t get along too good. But, we 
were fortunate. We got a lot of great --   
MH: Oh, interesting, interesting. So in your contracts came up at the same 
time it sounds like. 
(00:07:28) 
CT: Same time, yes. 
MH: Which probably made a big difference. 
CT: Yes it did. 
MH: I know that in Westbrook local that was a different situation.         
CT: Westbrook, they tried to bargain together but the production and the 
maintenance employees really never got along too good in Westbrook.  
(00:07:44) 
MH: That’s been my impression. Now what kinds of relationships did you 
have with other Scott you know the UPIU and the other paper worker locals?          




CT: The Maine Paper Council. We did have a Scott Council which we met at 
probably once a year with that group -- 
MH: The National. 
CT: The National one, yes. 
MH: Describe the 2 different organizations, the Maine Paper local, Maine 
Paper Council and the Scott Council. 
(00:08:21) 
CT: The Scott Council was more or less an informational type council where 
we’d get together and share information on what was going on at 1 particular 
mill or another. Just to do with Scott Paper issues.  
The Maine Labor Council was more to do with lobbying for laws, and state 
of Maine legislators, and was also a training. We utilized that, we’d meet and 
have 1 or 2 days of training on different issues. 
MH: I see. 
CT: That was the difference. 
(00:08:47) 
MH: I see. Were there kinds of things that you were learning, do you 
remember what you learned say from the Scott Council about what was going 
on and how that might have influenced your local bargaining or other 
practices? 
(00:09:02) 
CT: Well we get together and we talk about negotiation items, or issues that 
the company would try to make a big issue in 1 location. We knew that if 
happened there, it’d only be a matter of time before it’d be at our location.  
So, it made it good for us to prepare on how to handle that issue through the 




MH: So, you did learn things. You kind of got, sounds like Scott would tip 
their hand a little bit in the sense of 1 place before they might come at you   
and your local. 
CT: Yes it would or vice versa. It might try at our local 1st. But usually they 
picked on the smaller local 1st to try to get it passed there.  
Where our, where we had a new mill and things like that and it was more 
advantageous to keep that place going and not have so much labor problems 
there, that -- 
(00:09:51) 
MH: That gave you some advantage in bargaining.     
CT: I think it did, yes. 
MH: How many members were there in your union in those days? 
(00:10:00) 
CT: 600. 
MH: 600, okay. 
CT: Well it was 600 at the end of it. When it 1st started, it was just a pulp 
mill and then they built the 1st paper machine, then the next paper machine, 
and then the 3rd paper machine. So -- 
MH: Right and so, then when they got to 3 paper machines, they had 600. 
CT: Yes they did. 
MH:  Members of UPIU local. What’s the, what was the local number there? 
CT: Local 9. 
(00:10:20) 
MH: Local 9, okay. Now, what did you learn about, in those days, you know 
again leading up to ’87 or so.  
What did you learn about labor relations at Winslow and Westbrook and 
what would you say the contrast and parallels were between the 3 mills? 
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CT: Winslow for example they were an older mill. They were more or less in 
trouble as far as keeping the place going, to meeting the criteria that the 
company wanted.  
(00:10:52) 
So, the Winslow mill they worked more and more jointly together to give up 
things, to give up the restrictions between crafts, to give up some benefits, 
and things like that. 
(00:11:02) 
So, they were working more in the joint process than we were. And, they 
gave up a lot.  
I remember 1 meeting I went to where they were giving a presentation of 
what they were doing jointly together and I got up and spoke at the meeting 
and they talked about we don’t have no more grievances or arbitration cases 
here. 
(00:11:19) 
So, I got up and I said well I understand why you don’t have any, you’ve 
given up everything in the contract. You got nothing more to grieve. They 
weren’t happy with that comment but that’s really what it boiled down to. 
Trying to keep the mill going, I can understand why they did it. Trying to 
keep the mill going and in the end they shut it down anyway. 
MH: Yeah, now what about Westbrook. What was your sense of Westbrook, 
same or different? 
(00:11:42) 
CT: Westbrook a little different. Westbrook really was a local that took the 
Company on. They didn’t budge for nothing. I mean they had a lot of 
grievances a lot of arbitrations, every year, year after year after year. 




CT: Throughout the years, yes. Certain years we had a lot more because of 
the situation going on. But, throughout the year by year, they had more than 
we did, yes.  
MH: And, what was your sense of the character of leadership of the union 
locals of the other 2 mills? 
(00:12:19) 
CT: I can talk about Winslow. They had good leadership, they had different 
unions there. But they were in a survival mode trying to keep the place going.  
Westbrook eventually became in that mode when they were shutting down 
the pulp mill and things like that. But by that time they didn’t have any 
choice anyway, gonna be shut down.  
MH: Right. 
(00:12:30) 
CT: S.D. Warren and Skowhegan we were in a mode where we knew it was 
not gonna be shut down, we had more bargaining power.  
MH: So, it really really made for a different, allowed you to do different 
things. 
CT: Yes it did. 
(00:12:51) 
MH: What would be some of the different things that -- 
CT: Well, we never gave up jurisdiction between unions for a long period of 
time. We kept that jurisdiction guidelines while the other mills were giving it 
up in Westbrook, Muskegon, down in Mobile, Alabama places like that.  
(00:13:06) 
Gave up those rigid guidelines I guess from doing different jobs, flexibility. 
So when I said, like before Winslow, I understood why they did that. 
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Westbrook they’re still kind of rigid there because of the union’s production 
and the maintenance don’t get along at all. So they kind of hold in a strong 
line what they can do under the S.D. Warren contracts.  
(00:13:34) 
I think under Sappi, there’s been more flexibility now under Sappi. They’ve 
given up jurisdictions.  
MH: Right, right. That’s right. Did you think that Scott had, did you have a 
unified approach to the different S.D. Warren locals or was it kind of local by 
local? 
(00:13:55) 
CT: I think they tried to get a unified approach but the locals were not 
unified in doing the same thing. So, even though if they were unified in what 
they wanted to do, they found resistance from 1 location to another. 
(00:14:08) 
MH: I see, I see. Did you get a sense that labor relations was conducted 
primarily by the division or was it done by the international office of the 
Corporate headquarters? 
(00:14:24) 
CT: A lot of day-to-day stuff was left by the locals. Bargaining we got 
contract negotiations that was controlled by the national when it come to 
monetary issues.  
When you get into bargaining there when it come to monetary stuff they’d 
bring somebody in from headquarters.  
But the language on the day to day issue, I think they left it pretty much up to 
the local management.  
(00:14:45) 
MH: Just for context, I wanted to talk a little bit about the impact of the Jay 
strike because that came up about the same time as the jointness did.  
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How would you describe the impact that the Jay strike had on the union 
locals there and the Somerset mill? 
(00:15:06) 
CT: Jay strike was devastating to both sides. I mean that divided families 
from families not talking to one another and it really gonna be years and 
years before that ever gets corrected.  
Right now there are still families not talking, brothers and sisters and 
etcetera. 
(00:15:25) 
People look back on the Jay strike and they saw it was not a win-win 
situation. They saw that people end up losing their jobs. People that worked 
there for years.  
So that changed the attitude about going on strike knowing that permanent 
replacements could be brought in. So people looked at different avenues a 
way to do different things at that time.  
(00:15:46) 
And 1 of the things that came up was the international was interested in 
trying alleviate strikes also so they were looking for companies that would be 
willing to sit down and work on issues that would be good for both parties. 
That’s really how the Scott Paper jointness came about. 
(00:16:03) 
MH: Right, right, I see, I see. What kind of strike support did the locals there 
at Somerset mill give to the Jay workers? 
CT: We took up collections every week. We’d take over $2 to $3,000 a week 
donations to ‘em.  
I mean and we raised our union dues and gave money from the union dues 





MH: And so you would send a group to the Wednesday meetings every week 
with the money? 
CT: Yes we would. 
MH: What was that like? You must have gone to the meetings too. 
CT: Yes, I went to a lot of them, very energizing. You’d get up there and 
you’d see 1,000 or 1,200 people there in the union, in the hall there, and the 
speeches I would give and so it was very energizing.  
(00:16:50) 
The people really thought they were going to win. So the atmosphere there 
was we’re gonna win, we’re gonna take ‘em on, we’re getting support from 
the national, we’re getting support all over the country. 
But in the end when they brought in the replacement workers, that really 
killed the whole process. 
(00:17:05) 
MH: That’s right. Did you take anything, did you take anything back from 
those Wednesday meetings on what to do in your union that would influence 
what kind of leadership you brought to your union? 
CT: We really didn’t. Little leadership there was elected every, at that time, 
elected every 2 years. A lot of time the same officers run.  
(00:17:25) 
A lot of times you couldn’t get a lot of people that really wanted to get 
involved you know, spend the time and the effort in doing union type work. 
So, we’re just a small group that was interested in doing that so it wasn’t like 
when the nominations came up you had 30, 40 people running for 1 position. 
Might get 2 or 3 at the most.  
(00:17:43) 
MH: I see, I see, okay. Were there Jay strikers who got jobs at your mill? 
CT: Yes, there was. 
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MH: What was that like? Did they stand out? Did people talk to them about 
that? Did they have any kind of role? 
(00:17:59) 
CT: I know some people hired in production from the strike. Some people 
got hired in the IBEW electricians. And, some people got hired in the mill 
itself.  
There wasn’t a lot of talk about it because by that time the strike was over 
and people tried to put it behind them. So, there wasn’t talking a lot.  
(00:18:18) 
MH: I see, oh okay. So these folks got jobs pretty much after the strike had 
failed. 
CT: Yes it did. 
MH: Your sense now obviously was that the mill management didn’t mind 
hiring former strikers. 
CT: No they didn’t, no.  
MH: Do you have any sense of why? They felt like they were experienced 
paper workers? 
CT: They were experienced paper workers, they were dedicated, they 
worked there for years, they wouldn’t come in and work for awhile and move 
on. They knew if they got a job there, they would stay. 
(00:18:41) 
MH: Okay, interesting. Alright now moving to jointness and enabling.  
Before the jointness initiative, cause I know that was a big development at 
the time, what was your views about the idea of teams and reorganizing work 
and all the labor management cooperation that goes with it? 
(00:19:05) 




CT: At Skowhegan there, we went to the meetings, we listened what they 
had to say, but we never really got into a lot of jointness, what they wanted to 
do.  
(00:19:21) 
Cause we went to the meetings there, just to listen, and we didn’t fight it, but 
we didn’t get involved a whole lot.  
Probably the best we ever got involved with the jointness was through the 
OSHA program. The OSHA 200 Program. We did get involved in that. 
MH: Describe what OSHA 200 Program is. I know what it is but I want -- 
(00:19:45) 
CT: The OSHA 200 Program was where OSHA took a look at the 200 worst 
companies in the State of Maine, as far as the accidents that they had.  
And they created a program saying to these companies there that we want to 
create the OSHA 200 Program for you to sit down with labor and unions 
there and develop a program on how to create safety in the plant.  
(00:20:03) 
It’s not a mandatory thing, but if you don’t do it, we’ll probably gonna come 
in and do a wall to wall inspection.  
So, it really wasn’t a mandatory thing but the company knew that if they 
didn’t get involved that they were going to pay the bill in the long run. 
MH: And there was a stick hanging over them. 
CT: Definitely. 
(00:20:21) 
MH: So you’re saying that you’re able under sort of the framework of the 
jointness program to setup a committee to work on that project. 
CT: Yes there was.  
MH: And that went well? 
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CT: That went very well. In fact we got awarded the Hammer Program from 
Al Gore for one of the best OSHA Programs in the country. 
MH: Oh no kidding, no kidding. So what kind of drop in accident rates did 
you have? 
(00:20:46) 
CT: It dropped drastically for lost time, accidents, and things like that. But 
the company spent a lot of money too, doing this.  
So, correcting, guiding machines, correcting OSHA violations that was 
against the 1910 standards.  
(00:21:01) 
MH: I imagine that it must have been easier to do with a newer mill? 
CT: Yes it was. But even the newer mill, I mean, we had thousands of 
violations in that new mill. Thousands.  
It was unbelievable by the time the inspectors that we trained went around 
and doing all the inspections and what violations they actually found.  
(00:21:18) 
MH: Oh no kidding.  
CT: Unbelievable. 
MH: Some of those violations the workers must have known about before, 
right, or had a sense of? 
CT: Very few I mean they didn’t, they really didn’t understand what OSHA 
was and what the guidelines was on what was a violation or not until after, 
after the OSHA 200 Program. Then we had a lot of people that was aware of 
what it was. 
MH: I see, I see. So, it was kind of a learning experience for everybody to 




CT: Yes it was. It raised the awareness to everybody in the mill because 
everybody in the mill, we had about I’d say 12 to 15 people that were trained 
as OSHA inspectors.  
(00:21:56) 
They come in and trained them like regular OSHA inspectors, they had the 
training. They could fill out forms and they would take pictures of the 
violation and they’d fill out the form and send it to maintenance or send away 
to contractors to have that filled, repaired.  
(00:22:10) 
So, it was a good process I mean it was very, very good and raised awareness 
of everybody cause every time, turn out 1 2 year period that we had                
going constantly and them guys are doing that full-time, working on that.  
MH: Wow and these were employees of the mill? 
CT: Yes they were. 
MH: Wow, putting guards in and locks, processes, all those types of things. 
(00:22:29) 
CT: Yes. 
MH: I see, I see okay. Well, let me back up a little bit. How were you 1st 
presented, and where did you learn about the jointness program 1st? 
CT: We had a meeting with the international and the Corporate, the people 
from Corporate headquarters sat down and talk about the jointness and what 
it was all about and things like that.  
MH: What do you remember about how they presented that to you initially?  
(00:22:54) 
CT: They presented it, they talked about the reasons for it, doing this was to 
be a win-win situation.  
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Also talked about the Jay situation, what happened there and if we don’t 




CT: So we had to find common grounds that we could work on, not saying 
that we were always going to agree on everything, cause always got the 
process of the grievance process and arbitration.  
But we got to find areas where we can make it better for the unions and the 
company to work together.  
MH: Okay and the kind of people who would have been presenting this 
would have been the very heads, like John Nee and Wayne Glenn and 
Lippincort, was Lippincott there or not? 
CT: Yes. 
(00:23:34) 
MH: So what kind of impression, I mean you didn’t always see these people 
did you? 
CT: No we didn’t. 
MH: So, what was it like to have, you know, the brass from both sides there? 
CT: We listened to what they had to say, when we were skeptical about it. 
You know, yeah, yeah.  
It’s a win-win but it’s something the Company wants, you know. We’re 
happy with what we’ve got. We got a contract and if the Company violates 
the contract, we got ways of dealing with it.  
(00:23:56) 
We got a new mill, I’m talking Skowhegan, we got a new mill, good contract, 




MH: Okay, alright, that’s pretty clear. When you came back to Maine, what 
kinds of discussions did you have with the other Scott locals about how to 
deal with jointness? 
CT: Each local did their own thing. We really didn’t have a lot of meetings 
with them. Cause each location, let’s say Winslow was really into it. 
Westbrook didn’t get involved too much. We didn’t either.  
(00:24:30) 
They kept trying to get us involved in it. It was each location would decide 
how involved they wanted to get.  
They was always after me. Want to get together, the local HR department and 
manager. Want to get together so we can sit down and talk about this 
jointness thing so we can work together? 
My comment well I’m not interested in it. We’ve got a good contract here, 
got a good mill, I’m not interested.  
(00:24:53) 
I’ll tell you a funny story. One time the HR guy come down. And he says to 
me we got to get together and sit down and talk about this, he said. We rented 
this place down on the coast, he says. We can go down there and spend the 
weekend together and talk about the jointness program. 
(00:25:09) 
I said I don’t mind talking to you guys and resolving issues, but I’m not 
going to bed with you. 
No, no he said, we’ll get different rooms.  
[[laughing]] 
MH: So what ever came of it? 
(00:25:21) 
CT: We didn’t go to it. Part of the problem was that once we do something 
like that, go away with the Company and sit down and talk with them, the 
membership looks at us.  
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Are we representing the membership now or are we in bed with the 
Company? That was a fine line that we had to walk. 
MH: Sounds like you walked it so that the membership knew you were with 
them and not with management. 
(00:25:44) 
CT: That’s right. Anytime we did anything, we brought it up with the 
membership and the membership would vote whether they wanted to 
participate or not participate. 
Even the OSHA 200 Program, the membership voted yeah we want to 
participate in it. So, it wasn’t a decision that we made it was a decision the 
membership made. 
(00:25:59) 
MH: I see, I see. Interesting. Now one of the things that I heard about, and I 
wonder what your recollections are. I heard that at some point, the Maine 
Scott locals brought in Jane Slaughter of Labor Notes to give a training. 
(00:26:19) 
CT: I did that. 
MH: You did that. Okay well, so tell me the story about that. Like why did 
you think of that and then how’d you go about doing that. 
CT: Well at the time, the international was pushing this jointness, the 
Company was pushing the jointness, and we heard about The Inner Circle, a 
book written by Jane Slaughter.  
(00:26:39) 
So I got ahold, I read the book and looked at it and I said well she makes a lot 
of sense, you know, on what exactly the companies are looking for.  
So, I said it could be good to have another opinion here rather than just the 
opinion of our international and the Company.  
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So I put together the seminar and contacted Jane Slaughter and she came up 
and give a talk on what exactly this jointness can do and can’t do. 
[[background talking]]  
And, some of the bad things that’s happened on other companies that have 
had the jointness program. 
(00:27:09) 
MH: What do you remember about how the training went? 
CT: Went very good. People left the meeting and they was under the opinion 
that we really don’t want to get involved with jointness like the international 
and the Company wanted us to. 
MH: I see, I see. Who went to the meeting?  
(00:27:25) 
CT: Most of the Scott locals around went to it from Westbrook, Winslow, 
our local. We invited people from Muskegon -- 
MH: And people from Muskegon came?  
CT: Yeah. 
MH: Mobile? 
CT: I can’t remember whether Mobile was there or not. But we put this on 
without the international being involved. I put it on as a local president, local 
9.  
(00:27:49) 
MH: I’m sure the international reps knew about it. 
CT: Oh they knew about it. Yeah.  
MH: What was their view of it? 
CT: Some of the international reps didn’t like Jane Slaughter. Didn’t like her 





MH: So, but you had the right to do it and you went ahead and did it. 
CT: I had the right to do it, yes. 
MH: Okay. 
CT: Being a free country. 
[[laughing]] 
MH: Exactly, exactly. So, let me see if I just got what you say exactly right. 
So, you’re saying that what this is, this really confirmed up attitudes that the 
jointness thing was going to be mostly costly for the union. 
(00:28:34) 
CT: Yes, it was. 
MH: And how would it have been costly if you had fully cooperated? 
CT: If we fully cooperated, the way that the Company wanted us to be is 
they wanted total flexibility. Total flexibility I mean that was something that 
we held near and dear to our hearts.  
(00:28:48) 
We had specific unions there, we had job descriptions and things like that. 
The Company was, what we felt that they really wanted was everybody to be 
able to do anything.  
So that would eliminate grievances, eliminate arbitrations, and give them the 
flexibility that they wanted. 
(00:29:04) 
MH: What would it mean to give up grievances and arbitrations? 
CT: Without grievances and arbitrations we had no way to enforce the 
contract.  
If we didn’t have any job description guidelines, I mean we’d have nothing to 
grieve anyways. Similar to what Winslow did. They gave up all that stuff in 
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order to help the mill survive. They thought it was going to keep the mill 
running.  
MH: And obviously it didn’t work in Winslow. 
(00:29:28) 
CT: It didn’t work. They pulled the plug on Winslow and they were gone.  
[[phone ringing]] 
MH: So looking back on it then, do you still think it was the right decision 
thought not to participate in fully in the jointness program. 
CT: Yes I do. 
MH: And, why is that? 
(00:29:57) 
CT: I didn’t seen any real benefits for our mill. I mean our mill wasn’t in 
trouble financially. It was making good profits there. Had modern equipment, 
modern machinery. And the people wanted to keep the jurisdiction.  
(00:30:08) 
They didn’t want to give it up. Pipers didn’t want to do millwrights and other 
type work and millwrights didn’t want to do our work. And so if the 
Company was financially in trouble, then that would have been a different 
story.  
We’d a looked at it differently. Certain things we felt we could work together 
on but we wanted to keep our autonomy between 1 union and the other. 
(00:30:30) 
MH: And just on the outside looking in, people in the public say, will often 
be critical of unions for saying that they want to restrict job definitions and 
restrict flexibility. What is your response to that sort of criticism? 
(00:30:48) 
CT: My response to that is that’s a bargaining issue. We sit down and 
negotiate a contract and that’s what the company and union both agreed on.  
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So that has nothing to do with the public opinion. I mean both parties agree 
with that decision and that’s how we go forward. 
(00:31:03) 
MH: And the purpose in defining those job descriptions is so you can have 
seniority? 
CT: Seniority and job security.  
MH: And job security. So those are cornerstones in a sense? 
CT: Yes. 
MH: And once you give up those job definitions and the right to grieve about 
them, then you don’t have job security? 
(00:31:23) 
CT: No you don’t, not as much because at that point in time, millwrights can 
do the piping work or the pipers can do the millwright work or do 
maintenance and services type work and so you don’t know where it’s going 
to happen if there becomes a lay off. 
MH: Right, it can come from any direction. You’ve been in a rep, 
international rep, for sometime now. 
CT: 1997. 
MH: 1997. So you’ve seen a lot of different mills. 
CT: Yes I have. 
(00:31:49) 
MH: What is your sense of what’s happened to job security at those mills 
that have had that kind of flexibility and gotten the job language.       
CT: That’s tough to compare it because the economy is so different today 
than it was back when I was in the mill.  





CT: Back in the late ‘90’s, didn’t see a lot of flexibility. The smaller mills 
had more flexibility than the larger mills. Smaller mills had a smaller 
maintenance force. It always had the type of flexibility.  
Larger mills always had distinctive lines, job duties that been assigned. 
That’s the difference I see in the 2.  
Companies being sold, a lot of that flexibility, I mean rigid lines went away 
because they were in a mode of trying to keep the mill surviving, keeping it 
going.  
(00:32:44) 
So, when a new company when it came in, 1st thing they lay on the table is 
we got to have more flexibility. So people have a decision whether to agree 
with the flexibility or not have a contract and have them hire people from the 
outside.  
(00:32:56) 
MH: I see, I see.  Now I understand that particularly Mobile, but also maybe 
to a certain extent Muskegon, did go on with the flexibility like Winslow. 
Right? 
CT: Yes they did. 
(00:33:11) 
MH: From where you sit, what is your sense of what that got them or didn’t 
get them. 
CT: Well, Mobile, it didn’t get them anything. They lost. They shut the 
doors. They had a bad strike, while when the strike had a lockout down there. 
They locked ‘em out.  
MH: When did that take place? 
(00:33:29) 
CT: That took place in the ‘80’s. I’m not sure what year it was but that was a 
bad situation there.  
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Muskegon. Muskegon’s an older mill. So they were looking at flexibility in 
order to survive, keep the mill, and keep the jobs. 
MH: Do you think it’s worked for them or -- 
CT: I think it’s worked for them to some extent, yes, the Muskegon mill is 
still running. So, hasn’t hurt ‘em, kept ‘em alive, kept ‘em going. 
(00:33:57) 
MH: So, in the end, it’s sort of a last ditch thing when a mill’s otherwise 
probably gonna go down. 
CT: Yes it is. 
MH: I see, I see.  
CT: Now with the foreign competition it’s even more of an issue, keep the 
mills going. 
(00:34:12) 
MH: Yes, yes, yes. We talked about that when you came in.  
One other thing I’m curious about while I have you here, which is course 
things were relatively stable probably mostly most of the time that you were 
at the Somerset mill up until kind of the early to mid ‘90’s when the 
leadership of Scott changed.  
(00:34:39) 
There was a merger with Kimberly-Clark. There was Al Dunlap coming in as 
the CEO. Describe what that meant? How did it look from where you sat and 
what did that mean for your mill up there? 
(00:34:55) 
CT: Al Dunlap I mean his job was to come in and sell off Scott Paper S.D. 
Warren Company. Scott Paper that division went to Kimberly-Clark. The 




During that period of time we knew the place’s gonna be sold so we were 
anxious I would say to really know who’s going to buy the place. Buying the 
place looking for history of different companies.  
Was it going to be IP buying the place? We knew if it was IP, we were in for 
a big battle.  
(00:35:27) 
Irving was talking about buying the place. Looking at the history of what 
happened up in Canada, with some of the mills up there, we knew that 
probably a big battle with Irving.  
Sappi bought the place. Didn’t know too much history about Sappi so we 
figured it was a good deal because now we got a new company coming in 
that had no history here in the United States, that came from South Africa.  
(00:35:51) 
So everybody was, at the beginning, glad that they purchased it. And it 
worked out well. We had a 1 year extension of the contract during that period 
of time. Then all hell broke loose. 
[[laughing]] 
(00:36:08) 
MH: As layoff announcements started coming  
CT: Layoff announcements started coming and also Sappi had a different 
approach on negotiations on what they wanted.  
We felt they were bringing the South African leadership from over there from 
South Africa and try to instill it here in America.  
(00:36:27) 
We had big rallies around that time. We had 17 months of negotiations with 
Sappi. Rejected 3 contracts. They implemented the contract and eventually 
finally agreed to the contract.  
But the contract that Sappi had that we finally agreed to was gutted out the 
whole thing we fought against for years, flexibility issue.  
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But people still remembered the Jay strike and they would not go on strike at 
that time. Because of the permanent replacement.  
(00:36:56) 
MH: So, caught between a rock and a hard place. 
CT: Yes we were.  
MH: What was, what were the results of that period? I mean, how many, 
before the recession, how many jobs were downsized? 
(00:37:10) 
CT: Our place, there really wasn’t any at our location. Other locations there 
was, because the recession they closed down Mobile, Alabama. Shut that mill 
down.  
Muskegon that was kind of a questionable period of time whether they were 
gonna keep running the paper machines, shut some down, etcetera 
(00:37:33) 
Westbrook, they shut some machines down in Westbrook. Pulp mill shut 
down in Westbrook too. So -- 
MH: Yeah, they took it hard on the chin. So I think those were all the 
questions that I had planned to ask you.  
(00:37:49) 
But, you know 1 thing is I wanted to give you a chance to do is to look back 
on things I brought up today and ask if there’s something about this story that 
you think I should know about that I didn’t think to ask you about. 
(00:38:00) 
CT: As far as Scott Paper and the jointness? 
MH: Scott Paper and jointness and just trying to get a picture of the labor 




CT: At the beginning, I think, with Scott Paper owning the mill things went 
pretty good and then they changed it from a Scott Paper mill to an S.D. 
Warren division, when they built the paper machine.  
Because they wanted the paper to be under S.D. Warren. So that period of 
time didn’t see much of a change in the relationship. I’d say we had our share 
of grievances, share of arbitration cases, well we always talking working 
issues out.  
(00:38:43) 
The jointness came along. The IP strike probably came along and that 
changed a lot of people’s minds on how we’re gonna approach negotiations 
for example. They had different HR people they’d hire and let go. They 
didn’t have 1 person staying there for a long period of time. 
(00:39:03) 
MH: Oh, talk about that a little bit. How did that effect negotiations? 
CT: Well, you get used to 1 guy and how you’re negotiating and all of a 
sudden a new team would come in and have a different approach on how to 
do it. Same with the mill managers. They would come and go.  
(00:39:20) 
MH: Must have been harder to form a bond of trust if you had a sense the 
guy was gonna be gone in a couple of years? 
CT: Yes it was. Some of ‘em we were glad to see go so positive and a 
negative effect I guess. It wasn’t all bad. 
MH: It really sounds like you had the, from your point of view, the good 
fortune to have a relatively new mill that allows you to kind of sidestep the 
whole jointness. 
(00:39:52) 
CT: Yes it did. If it wasn’t for the new mill, I’m sure we would’ve been 
involved just as much as the other locations.  
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But with the new mill we knew we had more bargaining power. We knew 
they weren’t going to shut it down and that was the Cadillac of the whole 
operation. 
(00:40:05) 
MH: Right. That’s right, that’s right. I’m just curious from your perspective. 
I’m still learning about this.  
The paper up there that were sold on those machines was it the same kind of 
high end coated publication paper that the Westbrook mill made? 
CT: Yes. 
MH: So you were selling in the same market.  
CT: Yes.  
MH: That’s you know -- 
(00:40:25) 
CT: Westbrook had more specialty type paper. Where our paper was just 1 
standard high coated paper like white coated paper. While Westbrook had 
flexibility of making cardstocks or heavier type paper and things like that. 
MH: That’s right. Do you have a sense of which products those, that paper 
wound up being used for? 
CT: For Somerset? 
MH: Yeah. 
CT: National Geographic magazines and other magazines that had the high 
gloss paper for advertisements and things like that. So it was a higher quality 
magazines that they used them for. 
(00:40:59) 
MH: Did union leadership ever have a sense of what mills around the world 
you were competing with? 
CT: Not really, no. 
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MH: Okay. Got another question here. This always happens to me. Train of 
thought, just leaves you.  
(00:41:21) 
I’ll be kicking myself for half an hour after you’ve left on what was the next 
questions.  
(00:41:42)   
CT: I left the mill in 1997. Not voluntarily.  
MH: Oh, is that right. Do you want to tell me about that? 
CT: If you want to hear about it. 
MH: I’m curious, yeah. 
(00:41:56) 
CT: During 1997, well prior to that for 17 months we were in tough 
negotiations. Day after day after day meeting and trying to resolve it. Nobody 
ever budging on either side. 
 [[inaudible?]] people got discouraged in the mill. Any complaints that we 
had that we didn’t have the OSHA 200 Program anymore, so we’d file an 
OSHA complaints. 
(00:42:21) 
They were getting fined thousands, hundred thousands of dollars for OSHA 
violations. I would probably be the 1 to send in the violation to the OSHA.  
MH: So sort of a sense that you were making those fines happen? 
CT: Yes, yeah. Prior to that we’d turn in the violation and they’d have a 
group working on it and repairing it, but then there was no cooperation so we 
were not working with them either to correct the safety violations. 
(00:42:55) 
MH: That change happened after when Sappi came in? 
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CT: Yes it did. And during the negotiations there, the international brought 2 
people over from South Africa. The international union President over there 
and the local President and we had a big rally, probably had a thousand 
people at the rally down to Waterville. 
(00:43:13) 
Those people talking about what happens in South Africa. In South Africa the 
union President had to underground for a year because the Company had a hit 
out on him.  
They were going to kill him. So he had to underground for a year because his 
life was threatened. So they talked to us about things that happened over in 
South Africa with Sappi. Not a very good company.  
(00:43:36) 
We were creating a solidarity around the world against Sappi. They went 
back to South Africa and over there they could actually walk off the job.  
They didn’t have restrictive language in the contract. So they went over there 
and shut the whole country down for a year, Sappi, they all walked out of the 
mill for a day, shutting it down. So, it was getting bad. 
(00:44:02) 
Over here we were different places were doing different things, you know, 
not to help ‘em out, just to make it as hard as you can for the company.  
The last thing I did was I tagged out some welding machines that had not 
been inspected by OSHA. Probably inspected once a year. Not by OSHA, by 
the Company to see if there was a, any dangers in that welding machine.  
(00:44:25) 
When I worked up to Old Town, a friend of mine I used to work with got 
electrocuted by a welding machine. Touched it, and it was shorted out. It 
killed him. It was Danny Giles from Old Town back in early ‘70’s.  
So, I went around trying to find out if those machines had been inspected and 





MH: What does it mean to tag out the machine? 
CT: Not to use it because it has not been inspection. I tagged them out and 
the next day they sent me home for creating a slow down. So I was out of 
work for about 3 months, about 3 months.  
(00:45:05) 
And, this job came up at the International and I applied for it and got this job. 
MH: And did you get a sense that they were going to call you back? 
CT: They were not going to call me back. I went to arbitration and I lost the 
arbitration case. I wasn’t coming back anyway.  
The arbitrator knew that. They tried to work out a deal that I would sign a 
paper not to reveal the settlement to anybody and they would give me my lost 
wages. I said no I’m not going to do that.  
(00:45:33) 
So Chris Milsap, the HR guy from national he came out during the arbitration 
case. When my attorney and the Company attorney was outside trying to 
work out a deal, he come up to shake my hand.  
(00:45:44) 
I ain’t shaking your hand I said, Sappi went out hired a jerk, they found the 
biggest jerk they could find when they hired you. Boy, he went storming off 
and he told his attorney forget the deal. I ain’t dealing nothing.    
(00:46:00) 
MH: So that’s in your mind. That’s Sappi. 
CT: That’s Sappi, yeah. 
MH: Wow, wow. I hadn’t heard about that. I’d heard about some other 
things. But, I hadn’t heard about that.  
While we’re on it were there ever really bad accidents in that mill? 
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CT: Bad accidents. Well people hurt their back and people broke arms and 
legs but really not any real bad ones as far as people getting killed.  
(00:46:31) 
MH: The OSHA 200 thing really probably helped with that. 
CT: Yes it did, it really helped. 
MH: I see, I see. Now I remember that question I wanted to ask you which is 
that. 
What do you think was the best thing you ever did as a union leader and what 
do you think your biggest mistake was? What did you learn from the 
mistakes? 
(00:46:54) 
CT: As a union leader, I think the best thing we ever did is I, when I got 
elected President we sat down and did a strategic plan for the local.  
I developed a 5 year strategic plan on where we were, where we wanted to 
go, and how we wanted to get there over a 5 year period or 10 year period.  
(00:47:10) 
We set goals and we had the executive committee there approve those goals 
and everything. We took ‘em to the membership and the membership 
approved the strategic plan. 
We went forward and we met all of the goals. 
(00:47:23) 
MH: What were the big goals in the plan? 
CT: The goals was have a newsletter on a regular basis for the union. The 
newsletter was set aside some money to build a union hall. The other thing, 
set aside some money for a strike fund. 
When I left there, I think we had about $500,000 in a treasury and we 





MH: Wow. And they still have a good strike fund? 
CT: Still got a good strike fund.  
MH: Wow. 
CT: It’s called, not called a strike fund. Changed the name of it to a defense 
fund. So the money can be used to fight arbitration cases or anything like 
that. They probably still got quite a bit of money in the treasury compared to 
a lot of unions around. 
(00:48:07) 
MH: Sure, sure. No, that sounds nothing short of impressive in the time 
period and all that. 
CT: So, we’ve got 1 of the best union halls in the State. You seen it? You 
been up there? 
MH: No I haven’t but I should sometime. I want to get up and see the mill at 
some point.  
(00:48:22) 
CT: The union hall’s right on the same 202. Head towards Skowhegan and 
it’s up there about 3 miles on the left hand side. Big building. It’s about 50 by 
100, 110 feet long, I guess.  
MH: That’s good size. Good size building. 
CT: Big meeting room and 4 or 5 office spaces in there. 
MH: Who’s President up there these days? 
CT: Rodney Hiltz. 
MH: Oh, Rodney Hiltz is, oh okay. I know Rodney. I’ll have to, I’ll have to 
go up and see him.   
(00:48:50)   
CT: Good -- 
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MH: I’ve been meaning to interview him at some point. 
CT: He’s a good guy. 
MH: Yeah, he is. He spoke in my labor history class about 5 years ago.  
CT: Oh, did he. 
MH: Yeah, came down with Barbara Nicholson and advocated. 
(00:49:02) 
CT: When I was President up there he was Vice President in the production. 
That’s one, another thing we did when I got elected President, I restructured 
the executive committee.  
We had a President, Vice President, we elected 3 area Vice Presidents: 1 to 
represent maintenance, 1 to represent pulp mill, and 1 to represent the 
production employees.  
That worked out good because it was guaranteed that when come 
negotiations, that each group had their own representative sitting in there. 
(00:49:31) 
The area of Vice President was in charge of the shop stewards in that area. So 
we built a chain of command for people to go to and talk to where I didn’t 
have to now didn’t have to handle all the situations. So, and then -- 
MH: So that must have improved the communication up and down.     
CT: Yeah. Then we elected some training and education directors to do 
training for union training and that worked out pretty good. 
(00:49:58) 
MH: What kind of training did -- What kind of trainings were done? 
CT: They looked at educational type training for the membership. They 
worked with me for recommendations to gear what type of training we 
needed. We also utilized that through the Maine Labor Council to provide 




MH: Sounds like you built a very strong local during your leadership. 
CT: It turned out pretty good. I had good supporters; I had some good 
officers there. I mean that was the backbone of the whole thing. 
MH: You don’t do anything by yourself. 
CT: No, nothing. 
MH: Making a good union [[inaudible?]] 
Were there mistakes that you felt like you made or that others had made 
before you that you learned from? 
(00:50:36) 
CT: I think more education of the membership that’s 1 mistake that we’re 
doing. We’re really not providing or heading back there and still not 
providing enough education for the membership.  
(00:50:52) 
A lot of ‘em come there, go to work thinking that all the benefits they have 
and the wages they make is something that the Company gives them.  
(00:51:01) 
They don’t understand the history of how hard it was to bargain to get those 
benefits and wages after what they’re making today.  
So I think that’s the biggest downfall we have. Need to educate our 
membership.  
MH: That’s always an uphill battle, right? 
CT: Oh, definitely. 
MH: How do you get people to spend the time? 
(00:51:19) 
CT: Yup. Another thing now is election of state legislators or national. I 
mean that’s the big issue we need to change around. I mean people have to 
support labor issues.  
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I got a thing from the NRA wanting me to send in donations. The NRA has 
not been a great friend of labor. A lot of the candidates they support are 
Republican candidates or people that don’t support labor.  
(00:51:49) 
So I sent ‘em back a letter saying that at this time I could not help support 
‘em financially. But, if you would agree to help support labor candidates in 
the future, we may be able to work together.  
(00:52:00) 
I sent that to the Vice President of the NRA. [[crosstalk]] Haven’t heard a 
response back yet. I just sent it in last week.  
MH: Do you know, were you able to influence elections up in the Somerset 
area?  
CT: We negotiated in the contract for example anybody that gets elected to 
legislature would be given the time off and being paid for their leave of 
absence so they wouldn’t lose any money.  
(00:52:25) 
So we did get 2 or 3 people from our membership elected so that helped out 
that way.  
MH: Oh, is that right. Were you involved in campaigns as well? 
CT: Yes I was.  
MH: Did that change. I mean, were these Republican seats that became 
Democratic seats for example. 
CT: Yes. 
MH: Ha. That’s interesting cause that had happened in Westbrook as well 
when they unionized. 
Were you aware of the history down here? 




MH: Not too much, yeah. One thing I meant to ask you about since you 
probably know this. How did the mill up there come to be unionized? 
CT: That came out from Winslow. When the mill was in Winslow and then 
they talked about building the mill in Skowhegan. Winslow local sat down 
and bargained the contract for Skowhegan. 
(00:53:05) 
MH: I see. 
CT: With an automatic recognition that when they started the mill up that 
certain people could transfer from the Winslow up to the Skowhegan.  
MH: I see, I see. So the people with both experience and seniority, 
experience with the union and seniority, moved into the original mill. 
CT: Yeah. Frank Poulin was the President down in Winslow and when he 
transferred up to Skowhegan, he remained President of local 9. 
(00:53:29)  
MH: I see. 
CT: He was President, except for maybe a year; he had to get out because of 
some family issues. His father was sick, stuff like that. Then he came back in 
again until 1987 and I was Vice President.  
So him and I talked about it and he wanted to step back and I wanted to step 
up so we. He ran for Vice President and I ran for the President position. We 
switched roles.  
(00:53:50) 
MH: I see, l see. So that he was able to do less. 
CT: Yes.  
MH: And just going back to the beginning of all this. You said you had been 
a union officer at Old Town for the -- 
(00:54:03) 
CT: Yes I was. 
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MH: How’d you get interested in unions in the 1st place.  
CT: They needed a Treasurer there so 1 guy asked me if I’d be interested in 
being the Treasurer. So, that’s all it took, was somebody asking.  
MH: Is that a lesson you took later when you were a leader? 
CT: I tried to ask people to get involved, yes. 
MH: And, that’s pretty much how it happens, right. 
(00:54:28) 
CT: Yes it is. A lot of people you know, you put up a notice or something, 
we need volunteers. Nobody volunteers a notice.  
But if you ask ‘em personally, they have a hard job saying no. Yes, I’ll do it 
because you’re asking ‘em they don’t want to say no. Once they get involved, 
they see a big difference. 
Part of the problem is not asking. 
MH: Now when it came to, did you recruit certain kinds of folks to come 
into the union leadership? 
(00:54:57) 
CT: Not really, I mean. I never went out ask anybody if they’d run for an 
office, no.  
But when they got in there, I tried working with them, so they, teach ‘em how 
to do the job we sent them away to training seminars and things like that. 
MH: I see, I see. Okay, well I think I’ve asked you all the questions that I 
prepared plus a few others as well. Anything else that comes to mind before 
we finish today? 
(00:55:24) 
CT: Can’t think of nothing. Guess we -- 
MH: We covered some very interesting history this is very helpful for what 
I’m trying to learn about. 
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You know, one of the things that that I’m writing about is that, have you read 
any of the sort of academic articles about the jointness program that Scott 
did? 
CT: Yes.  
(00:55:50) 
MH: So you’ve what seen I mean it’s Getman and Marshall had that big, big 
article about that is that, you know, from that perspective jointness was kind 
of all sun and light.  
And they knew that the Scott locals up in Maine, for the most part S.D. 
Warren locals, didn’t really go along with it. They don’t have much of an 
explanation why. 
(00:56:14) 
And, from the perspective here it’s interesting to see how, you know, from 
my point of view, how is it that they think they could easily hatch this idea at 
the top and get everybody to go along, you know, given all the local 
conditions. 
CT: Well, they hatched it at the top I think and yes that’s true, but they didn’t 
force each location to go along with it.  
MH: Right. 
CT: That was a decision each location made on their own. So -- 
MH: Right, right, right. Uhm -- 
(00:56:44) 
CT: And I think it helped out even S.D. Warren thing like that. Because they 
didn’t come after a lot of things from that period of time that other companies 
came after.  
(00:56:52) 
Whether it was to give back double time or things like that they kind of 




CT: So it helped us in the long run too. It didn’t hurt us. Even though we 
didn’t get involved that much. 
(00:57:02) 
MH: Right. In a certain sense, you had the best of both worlds.  
CT: Yes we did.  
MH: Interesting, interesting. Well Carl thank you very much for taking your 
time to do this. 
CT: Your welcome. 
End of interview 
 
(00:57:10) 
MH: Just a couple of extra thoughts after we went off recording here.  
I did, he did bring up a strike, that is to say Carl Turner brought up a strike 
that took place in 1985. It was over going to 12 hour shifts which the union 
wanted and it was replacing this other swing shift with a shift that I guess 
they had in the pulp mill.  
(00:57:40) 
Where they would work, and this is what they’ve done since then, 12 hours 
on 3 days in a row and then 12 hours off and then alternate each week day 
shift and the night shift. 
They went to a 3 week strike to win that and they results of it, I mean it 
means the workers have work 6 months a year, 180 days a year, and have 180 
days off.  
(00:58:12) 
They wind up getting Sunday premium pay. Some weeks, some months it 




And they get plenty of time off to be with their family. And I guess 1 of the 
big benefits was that there was a significant drop in absenteeism. Which of 
course really helps the Company out as well as the workers. So the Company 
was resistant to it to the point that they had to go to a 3 day, 3 week strike. 
(00:58:47) 
They won the strike, it worked out, and they still have that to this day.  
He gave me the list of a few people to talk to one of whom is Frank Poulin 
who’s a former paper workers’ President at Winslow before him for 10 years, 
and he had come over, I’m sorry, at the Somerset mill. And before that he 
was at Winslow as the President and he came over so he has a lot of history.  
Another President at Winslow later is a Jerry Michaud, have his number. 
He’s an international rep for PACE now.  
IAM President there during the jointness Stanley Short. And finally a Tina 
Fernald who I may be able to find through Karl Dornish. All good leads. 
End of recording.  
(00:59:38) 
 
